Some questions regarding faith and its relationship to the believer:

    a) Are all a-priori claims equally true in themselves?
    b) Ought all a-priori claims by others than yourself be considered 
       equally true to the end of discovering truth?
    c) Are items of faith with relation to those 
       who believe them equally believed?
       c1) Ought they be?
    d) Are all claims of belief truely believed?  Is there ambiguity in
       one's convictions?
    

   The confusion of these is undoubtedly the source of confusion between
us on this issue.  Firstly let us agree that an item of faith, or an a-priori
claim, is a belief so grounded in the believer that he or she can not manage
any doubt with regards to it.

   On the question of a), it is apparent that among those claims which _are_
true, they are all equally true in themselves.  Among those claims which
are false, they are all equally false in themselves.  For the truth of some
assertion depends on whether the meaning of the assertion has existence, and
since nothing may both be and not be, and since there is no degree in simple
existence, we may conclude that there is no degree or ambiguity among the
truth of the notions _in themselves_.

   On the question of b), I say this:  No, the several things which people
all have faith in are not equally true, or equally likely to be true, or
anything of the sort.  Some believe things which are patently false, some
believe things obviously true.  Of those things which others believe to be
true, but WE are in doubt with regards to them, we may say that this belief
of another is more likely or less likely true, or more suspicious or less, etc.
In this case, this claim by another would be nothing but an item of doubt
to us, and would be evaluated as such, _not_ as one of our beliefs, since
we have already admitted doubt in it, and an item of faith never admits of
doubt (by definition).

  On the question of c), the answer is clearly yes.  Since, by definition
above, an item of faith admits of no doubt in the believer of such, and
such an absolute acceptance of the truth of the claim would put it's
truth with relation to the believer in the same catagory answered in 
question a, it would thus admit of no doubt whatsoever, and without doubt
there can not be a notion of degree of belief.  

  On c1), since in this case a judgement is called for, and such a judgement,
if it came from the believer, would bring us back to question c, we find
nothing new learned from that angle.  If the judgement is made of a believers
claim be another, we find that this is actually question b, and is thus
answered above.

  Lastly, on question d), I say this:  Since an item of faith admits of no
doubt, then in cases where someone _says_ they believe x, but entertain 
some doubt (even to the point of saying that they are "almost certain"), then
this would not fit the definition of an item of faith, but would be a simple
opinion with respect to the believer (or non-believer as the case may be).


<comments to the prior conversation>

   On your more particular question of belief in God as opposed to belief
in perception and reason, I say this:  they are all three true.  I have no
doubt of this.  Moreover, if you wish to know what is true, I would suggest
that you acknowledge them as well.  If you wish to discuss some of the
philosophy of these in particular, lets have at it. There should, however, be
no question of matters which I know to be true without question vs. those of 
which I very greatly suspect to be true (like the belief in the existence of
China, which I've never seen), but can not reasonably say that I am certain
(and am thus, fundamentally, in a state of doubt).